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I. 
The 
Opening Brief seeking to minimize its participation in a prior matter initiated by A11aconda 
Investments, LLC ("Anaconda") and Portfolio FB-Idaho, LLC ("Portfolio") against the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), which matter was adjudicated and resolved in 
United States District Court for the State of Idaho (hereinafter refen-ed to as the "Federal 
Case"). 1 Stilwyn seeks to characterize its participation in the Federal Case as one in which it 
simply intervened in a declaratory judgment action between these parties. However, such 
representations are belied by the actual record of the proceedings in the Federal Case. 
First, the Federal Case involved more than just Anaconda/Portfolio's seeking 
declaratory judgment establishing its right to an interest in subject property as it also included 
the FDIC' s counterclaim against those same parties for slander of title involving the same parcel 
of real property. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the record of the proceedings also 
establishes that after Stil'w')'n voluntarily sought to intervene and subject itself to federal 
jurisdiction with regard to the claims at issue in the Federal Case, it was no mere bystander to 
those proceedings. Rather, as it acknowledged in filings made in those proceedings, Stilwyn 
"actively" sought to pursue its rights under a slander of title claim. (R. Vol. 2, p. 321.) However, 
after having interjected itself in the Federal Case and pursued its claim for slander of title, 
1 In presenting its arguments in this Respondents' Brief, it must be acknowledged, as it was 
below, that Idaho First Bank's position in this litigation is similarly aligned to those of these 
responding parties. As such, the arguments advanced by Idaho First Bank in its Respondent's 
Brief are joined and incorporated herein. 
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Stilwyn abandoned its efforts in the Federal Case and determined instead to initiate a separate 
litigation on the very same claim slander oftitle claims in the Fifth Judicial District Court for the 
State of Idaho (hereinafter referred to as the "State Case") against these Respondent-Defendants 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Page Respondents"). 2 
The District Court in the State Case was not distracted by these efforts of Stihvyn to 
subsequently recharacterize the nature and scope of its participation in the Federal Case. The 
District Court properly applied the principles of claim preclusion to hold that Stihvyn was barred 
from asserting the very same claims in the State Case that should have been litigated by Stilwyn 
in Federal Case, even if they were not actually litigated by Stilwyn. This Court should conclude 
likewise and affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Page Respondents. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In large part, the underlying facts necessary for resolution of this matter are not in 
dispute. Stilv,ryn correctly notes, as did the District Court, that this case has its origins in the 
efforts of a group of private investors (the Page Respondents) through the legal entities they 
established (Anaconda and Portfolio) to acquire the rights to the Stilwyn loan. The Stihvyn loan, 
originally possessed by the First Bank of Idaho, had been put up for auction by the FDIC upon 
First Bank ofldaho's failure, and the Defendant-Respondent Idaho First Bank of McCall ("IFB") 
had been the successful bidder for the Stihvyn loan. Thereafter, the FDIC objected to the IFB's 
2 For purposes of this brief, "Page Respondents" shall refer to Michael Page, Michael Edward Page Trust, 
Michael Page 2008 Revocable Trust, John Sofro, Bryan Furlong, Wali Investments, LLC, David Wali, 
Anaconda Investments, LLC, Anaconda Managers, LLC, Po1tfolio FB-Idaho, LLC, Rokan Property 
Services, LLC, Rokan Financial Services, LLC, and Robert A. Kantor. 
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attempt to sell and/or assign the Stihvyn loan to Anaconda, which objection ultimateiy resulted 
in the rescission of IFB's successful bid of the Stilwyn loan. Portfolio, who had been assigned 
Anaconda's interest in the Stihvyn loan, along with Anaconda itself, sought to establish its rights 
in the Stilwyn loan by way of a declaratory judgment action against the FDIC in the Fifth 
Judicial District for the State of Idaho. 
It is at this point in the procedural history between these parties where, although truly not 
in dispute, Stihvyn seeks to downplay the actual course of events which transpired between the 
parties. For example, at page 3 of the Appellant's Brief, Stilwyn correctly identifies the fact that 
the FDIC removed Anaconda/Portfolio's declaratory judgment action against it to the United 
States District Court for the State of Idaho. Stilwyn then proceeds to discuss the federal court's 
disposition of Anaconda/Portfolio's declaratory judgment claim, making no mention of the fact 
that upon removal the FDIC asserted a counterclaim against Anaconda/Portfolio alleging that 
their continued claim of an interest in the property, which secured the Stilwyn loan, gave rise to a 
claim for slander of title. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 147-157.) Stilwyn's acknowledgement of the FDIC's 
counterclaim is only casually mentioned several pages later and, despite its acknowledged 
presence, does not stop Stilvvyn from continually characterizing the Federal Case throughout its 
Appellant's Brief as solely a "declaratory judgment action". (Appellant's Brief, pp. 5 & 13.) 
However, the presence of the FDIC's counterclaim for slander of title cannot be 
overlooked. In fact, also understated by Stilwyn in its recitation of the prolonged procedural 
history between these parties is the fact that Stihvyn itself specifically identified the harm it 
would suffer as a result of Anaconda/Portfolio continued assertion of an interest in the real 
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property secured by the Stilwyn loan as the basis for its right to intervene in the Federal Case in 
the first instance. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 221-246.) Based on this assertion it made in its Motion to 
Intervene, tbe federal court granted Stihvyn's request to intervene in the proceedings as a matter 
of right pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). (R. Vol. 1, pp. 248-257.) In granting Stihvyn's 
motion to intervene as a matter of right, Stilwyn did not limit the scope of its participation nor 
did the federal court place any conditions or restrictions upon its participation in the Federal 
Case. (Id.) 
Accordingly, and also unstated by Stilwyn in its recitation of the procedural history, is 
that upon its intervention in the Federal Case, Stilwyn actively participated in the litigation and 
did not limit its pai1icipation to issues solely pertaining to Ananconda/Portfolio's declaratory 
judgment claim against the FDIC. Rather, it also actively participated "consistent with its stated 
intention to pursue the slander of title claim" in the Federal Case, including the serving of written 
discovery on Anaconda/Portfolio as well as participating in and taking depositions of a number 
of witnesses. (R. Vol. 2, p. 326-328.)3 
Significantly, it should be noted that this characterization of Stilwyn's active participation 
is not merely the Page Respondents casting of its actions, but rather the express representation 
that Stilwyn itself made to the federal court when it sought, six weeks prior to trial, to "confirm" 
its status as party to the slander ohitle claim in the Federal Case. As Sti1Vvyn represented: 
3 Stilwyn specifically identified the activities it took consistent with "its stated intent to pursue 
the slander of title claim" within its Memorandum in Support of Motion to Confinn Status As A 
Party to Slander of Title Counterclaim. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 327-328.) 
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Stilv.;n has actively pursued its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title 
claim, including participation in the status conference regarding that claim and 
setting a trial date, serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses, 
noticing and taking depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July 
11,2011. 
(R. Vol. 2, p. 321.) 
However, despite its intervention as a party in the Federal Case and its indisputable active 
pursuit of its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title claim, Stilwyn determined to 
withdraw its assertion of the slander oftitle claim. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 340-342.) In so doing, it did 
not receive any judicial approval for its purported attempt to remove its slander of title claim 
from the Federal Case nor did it obtain the consent of any of the parties to the Federal Case for 
its removal without prejudice from those proceedings. Rather, as Stilwyn acknowledges, the 
matter was dismissed "in its entirety" and Stih:vyn made no objection to the federal court's entry 
of dismissal with prejudice of the Federal Case. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 344-356.) 
Upon the dismissal of the Federal Case, Stihvyn initiated the present litigation in State 
Case seeking to asse1i the very same claims that it had already actively litigated in the Federal 
Case. (R. Vol.I, pp. 17-43.) Accordingly, on March 9, 2013, IFB filed its Motion for Summary 
Judgment, asserting that as a result of Stilwyn's involvement in the Federal Case, Stilwyn's 
claims in the State Case were barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 381-
383.) The remaining Page Respondents joined IFB's Motion, providing supplemental arguments 
specifically identifying why IFB's assertion of claim preclusion as against Stilwyn was equally 
applicable to them in view of their relationship to the transaction in question. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 
427-429, 45-456.) 
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23, 2013, District Court entered Decision Granting 
Motion for Summary correctly holding that Stilwyn's claims in the State 
Case were under the doctrine of res judicata as such claims, if not actively pursued in the 
Federal Case by Stilwyn, should have been litigated therein. (R. Vol. 5, pp. 1091-1101.) The 
District Court entered its Amended Judgment dismissing all claims against all Defendants on 
September 12, 20 i 3 and this appeal by Stilwyn followed. 
HI. ARGUMENT 
A. The District Court Correctly Concluded That, Upon Stihvyn's Voluntary 
Determination To Intervene As a Party In The Federal Case And Active 
Participation Therein, Stilwyn's Claims In These Proceedings Were Barred 
By Res judicata (Claim Preclusion). 
As noted above, Stilwyn begins its attack on the District Court's opinion by 
mischaracterizing the nature of the Federal Case and further minimizing its involvement therein 
all an effort to bolster its assertion that it did not, nor was it ever compelled to, assert the 
claims that it seeks to present in these proceedings. However, as the foregoing procedural 
history demonstrates, the Federal Case was not simply a "declaratory judgment action" initiated 
by Anaconda/Portfolio, as the Federal Case also included the FDIC's assertion of a counterclaim 
alleging slander of title. Moreover, the foregoing also refutes Stihvyn's attempt to characterize 
its involvement in those proceedings as "simply" joining the Federal Case as an intervenor. The 
record demonstrated that Stihvyn voluntarily chose to intervene in the Federal Case without 
reservation or limitation and did so based on the express assertion that it possessed the right to 
intervene as a result of the Ananconda's purported wrongful claim of an interest in the real 
property secured by the Stilwyn loan. Moreover, the record also shows that Stilwyn further 
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expressly identified the intent of its intervention by requesting judicial confirmation of its status 
as a counter-claimant joining in the FD I C's siander oftitle cause of action. 
Were such representations by Stilwyn of its limited nature and scope of its participation 
in the Federal Case of any merit, one would have to wonder what purpose Stihvyn actually had 
in voluntarily seeking to intervene in the Federal Case in the very first instance and why with 
such minimal involvement it undertook such costly activities. However, such an inquiry is just 
as academic as consideration of the Stilwyn's chief defense to the application of claim 
preclusion. Stilwyn argues at pages 12-20 that, as it was merely an intervenor to the Federal 
Case, there were no claims by an "opposing party" asserted against it and therefor it could not be 
compelled by Rule 13(a) to assert any counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise, against any party 
to those proceedings. This inquiry is wholly unnecessary as the record establishes without 
question the correctness of the District Court's ultimate holding that having chosen the Federal 
Case as the forum for its claims, Stilwyn cannot now reassert them in these proceedings. For this 
reason, the newly cited cases4 by Stihvyn addressing the necessity of a claim by an "opposing 
party" is inapplicable to the present case as none of those cases address a scenario where a party 
intervenes as a matter of right against the assertion of certain claims and thereafter actively 
pursues its own interest in those proceedings as Stilwyn did in the Federal Case. 
As noted above, although the original proceedings in the Federal Case involved only 
Anaconda/Portfolio and the FDIC, Stilwyn filed a Motion to Intervene as a matter of right 
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pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). (R. Vol. 2, pp. 221-224.) In so doing, Stilwyn expressly 
stated that its intervention was necessary because Anaconda/Portfolio's filing of a lis pendens 
had piaced a cloud on the property and caused it damage. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 222.) Significantly, in 
seeking to intervene in the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2), Stihvyn did not seek to limit 
its participation in the Federal Case, nor were any conditions to its intervention as a matter of 
right imposed by the federal court. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 248-257.) 
This fact is of substantial import as it is well recognized that "[w]hen a party intervenes, 
it becomes a full participant in the lawsuit and is treated just as if it were an original party." 
Schneider v. Dumbarton Developers, Inc., 767 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Accordingly, 
the Ninth Circuit has recognized that where an intervenor is added pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 
24(a)(2), it enters "the suit with the status of original parties and are fully bound by all future 
court orders." United States v. State of Or., 657 F.2d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir. 1981). As a result, 
"[b ]y successfully intervening, a party "makes himself vulnerable to complete adjudication by 
the federal court of the issues in litigation between the intervener and the adverse party." Id., 
quoting 3B Moore's Federal Practice P 24.16(6), at 24-67] to 24-673 (2d ed. 1981). See also, 7 A 
C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedures 1920 (1972). 
Thus, Stihvyn's entire argument about the necessity of an "opposing party" in order for 
claim preclusion to apply in this case is without application in the context of this case. Stihvyn, 
by virtue of its voluntary determination to intervene as a matter of right in the Federal Case, 
4 While Stilwyn advanced this lack of "opposing party" argument below, on appeal it seeks to 
bolster its position with a series of cases which were not presented to the District Court in the 
RESPONDENTS OPENING BRIEF- PAGE 8 
19285-00 I / 697952 
placed itself in the adversarial position with the plaintiffs therein such that it not only subjected 
itself to whatever relief might be afforded to those plaintiffs, but also, by logical extension the 
consequence of any relief it either sought or could have sought in those proceedings. 
Having entered the Federal Case just as if it were an original party, the record reveals that 
Stihvyn proceeded with the asse1iion that the actions of the plaintiffs therein constituted a slander 
of title for which it was entitled to a remedy. As Stihvyn represented to the federal court in its 
Motion to Confim1 Status As A Pruty To Slander of Title Counterclaim: 
Stilwyn has actively pursued its rights against Anaconda under the slander of title 
claim, including participation in the status conference regarding that claim and 
setting a trial date, serving discovery requests, receiving discovery responses, 
noticing and taking depositions, all in preparation for the Court trial set for July 
I 1, 2011. 
(R. Vol. 2, pp. 321.) 
Thus, an examination of the procedural history of the Federal Case conclusively 
establishes that not only did Stilwyn by virtue of its intervention subject itself to the jurisdiction 
of the federal comt as if it were an original party in the Federal Case, it "actively pursued" 
litigation in supp01t of its claim of slru1der of title. There is simply no need for a hypothetical 
analysis to be applied with regard to under what circumstances a pariy with no claims asserted 
against it by an "opposing party" must nonetheless assert claims or risk the bar of res judicata. 
Stihvyn inserted itself into the Federal Case, made itself subject to the plaintiffs' claims therein 
and, as a result, was not only compelled to assert any claims it had against those same plaintiffs, 
first instance. (Appellant's Brief, page 18-20.) 
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it, in fact, did so. Accordingly the District Court correctly concluded that res judicata applied 
and dismissed all claims against all Defendants. 
It should be noted this conclusion is wholly in accord with the principles and purposes 
which underlie the application of I.R.C.P. 13(a) and t.½e doctrine of claim preclusion. Although 
distinct legal principles, there is a uniformity of purpose in the requirement of I.R.C.P.13 which 
compels a party to a litigation to bring any claim it believes it possess against any opposing party 
arising from the same transaction or occurrence and the consequence imposed by the doctrine of 
claim preclusion resulting from a party's failure to pursue such a claim in a prior litigation.5 
Compare Blaser v. Cameron, 116 Idaho 453, 456, 776 P.2d 462, 465 (Ct. App. 1989) (stating 
that "the policy behind Rule 13(a) is to avoid multiple lawsuits between the parties to a 
transaction or occurrence.") and Hindmarsh v. Mock, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002) 
(recognizing that res judicata principles serve the fundamental purposes of the preventing 
repetitious litigation and the harassment ofrepetitive claims). 
This overlapping purpose behind the identification of compulsory counterclaims and 
application of claim preclusion has been recognized by the federal courts. See e.g., Publicis 
Commc'n v. True N. Commc'ns Inc., 132 F.3d 363,365 (7th Cir. 1997) (stating "[t]he definition 
of a compulsory counterclaim~a claim that "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is 
5 As a result, it should not be surprising that the interpretation of each is given a broad 
construction. See Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 259, 668 P.2d 130, 135 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(stating, "the transactional concept of a claim is broad, and that the bar of claim preclusion is 
similarly broad."). 
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matter of the party's claim"-mirrors triggers a defense of 
preclusion (res judicata) if a claim was left out of a prior suit. 
None of these principles of judicial economy or efficiency are served by permitting 
Stilv,;yn to voluntarily choose to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court in the Federal Case 
without reservation, pursue its claims in the Federal Case without limitation and then abandon 
them in apparent favor of their pursuing them in a different forum. As the trial court recognized, 
Stilv,ryn "chose to enter the fray in the Federal Case and must live with the consequences." 
(R. Vol. 5 p. 1089.) The Page Respondents herein submit that the consequence of Stilwyn's 
decision is the complete bar of those claims in these proceedings and request that this Court 
affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Page Respondents. 
B. The Doctrine Of Res judicata Is Fully Applicable To The Counterclaims That 
Should Have Been, And Were In Fact, Asserted In The Federal Case. 
As an alternative attack upon the determination of the District Court in these proceedings, 
Stihvyn further argues that "this Court [has] held that the res judicata doctrine does not apply to 
the litigation of counterclaims." (Appellant's Brief at p. 20) However, in its assertion of this 
broad sweeping principle of law, Stilwyn overlooks that this Court's pronouncements in Joseph 
v. Darrar, 93 Idaho 762, 472 P.2d 328 (1970), upon which it relies were specifically limited to 
permissive counterclaims not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and which were 
not actuallv litigated in the prior proceeding. Id., 93 Idaho at 765, 472 P.2d at 331. Neither of 
these limitations apply in the present context, as it is clear that Stihvyn's claim for slander oftitle 
did arise under the same transaction or occurrence which was the subject of the Federal Case in 
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the first instance and, even if it were not considered compulsory (which by Stilwyn's wholesale 
intervention as a defendant, it was), was nonetheless, by Stilwyn's own admission, actively 
pursued by it in the Federal Case. 
Stihvyn's further reliance on Kootenai Electric Co-op., Inc. v. Lamar C01p., 148 Idaho 
116, 219 P.3d 440 (2009) is likewise unsupportive of its attempt to excuse its active pursuit and 
then abandonment of its claim in the Federal Case in favor of a subsequent suit. At no point in 
the majority opinion in Kootenai Electric is there ever any discussion that a party to a litigation 
must await the assertion of a claim against it before it is obligated to respond with any claims it 
might have against that party. Rather, the majority opinion holds that Kootenai Electric Co-op 
("KEC"), having detem1ined to assert claims against a co-defendant (Lamar), was thereupon 
obligated to bring all claims arising out of the transaction or occurrence which was the subject of 
the litigation involving the two. As KEC had voluntarily chosen to actively litigate its claims 
against Lamar in a prior federal matter, this Court held it could not assert in subsequent state 
court proceedings an additional claim that it could have made but failed to pursue to finality in 
the prior federal case. Thus, in addition to being factually inapposite to the situation presented 
by Stilwyn in these proceedings, the guiding principle to be gleaned from the Court's analysis in 
Kootenai Electric Co-op, is the very same principle that the trial court below recognized here, 
i.e. that once a party detennines to enter the fray and pursue its claims against a party to the 
litigation, it must assert all its claims or risk having those claims barred in a subsequent lawsuit. 
Stilvvyn's reliance upon Joseph, supra, and Kootenai, supra, avails it nothing and this 
Court should affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Page Respondents. 
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C. Even If The Declaratory Judgment Exception To Res judicata \Vere 
Recognized, It \Vould Not Apply In This Case. 
Stilv,ryn further urges this Court to excuse it from the bar of res judicata by requesting 
that this Court recognize an exception to its application in cases where the prior suit was limited 
to a declaratory judgment action as proposed by the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 33. 
'Wbile it is true that this Court has looked to the Restatement for guidance in matters of first 
impression, this Court has repeatedly stated that such use should not be considered a categorical 
adoption of all its provisions as each proposition advocated therein will be considered 
individually by this Court. See e.g., Diamond v. Farmers Group Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 149, 804 
P.2d 319 (1990). However, consideration of this exception is unnecessary in the context of these 
proceedings because Stihvyn would not be entitled to its application even if this Court were to 
determine it to be an appropriate exception to the otherwise proper application of res judicata 
principles. 
Although Stilwyn seeks to characterize the Federal Case as one which "started and ended 
as a declaratory judgment action" (Appellant's Brief at p. 28), the record reveals the contrary. 
While it is true that the plaintiffs in the Federal Case initiated the action as one for declaratory 
judgment, the defendant (FDIC) responded with a counterclaim for slander of title thereby 
altering the character of the litigation between the parties. Upon its intervention in the Federal 
Case, Stihvyn did not limit its participation to solely issues concerning the adjudication of the 
plaintiffs' declaratory judgment but also, by its own admission, actively participated in the 
pursuit of the slander of title claim. Furthermore, after the federal court's adjudication of the 
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declaratory judgment claim, the case did not "end" as seemingly represented by Stihvyn. Rather, 
the Federal Case did not reach its conclusion until after the federal court had entered its Order 
that "the FDIC-R's slander of title claim shall be dismissed with prejudice, and this case shall be 
dismissed in its entirety" which order was incorporated into a Judgment entered therewith. (R. 
Vol. 2, pp. 349-350, 352.) The federal court subsequently entered an Amended Judgment which 
recognized that in addition to the dismissal of the slander of title claim its prior Memorandum 
Decision and Order which resolved "all other claims among the parties" remained in force. 6 (R. 
Vol. 2, pp. 354-355.) 
Accordingly, there can be little doubt that the Federal Case was not simply one for 
declaratory judgment and the parties to that proceeding, Stilwyn included, certainly did not treat 
it as such. For this reason, Stihvyn's request that this Court consider the adoption of the 
declaratory judgment exception to res judicata should be rejected as it would be without 
application to it in any event. 
6 In its Appellant's Brief, Stilwyn makes the assertion that this Amended Judgment should not be 
considered a "final judgment". (Appellant's Brief, page 33-36) However, there can be no 
question that the Federal Case acted as a dismissal with prejudice, nor does Stihvyn assert 
anything to the contrary. Rather Stilwyn seeks to put itself in the seemingly contradictory 
position of accepting the benefit of some of the provisions of the Judgment but not all. Having 
voluntarily intervened in the Federal Case without limitation, it must thereby accept the 
consequence of its complete dismissal with prejudice to include the conclusive and preclusive 
effect of not only "every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Ticor, supra, 144 Idaho at 
126, 157 P.3d at 620. 
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That The Respondents Were 
Of The Doctrine Of Res judicata Based On Claim 
Having demonstrated the District Court properly applied the doctrine of claim 
preclusion to Stihvyn's attempt to reassert the me claims in the State Case, the only issue that 
remains is the appropriateness of the trial court's determination that claim preclusion barred the 
assertion of Stihvyn's claims against Page Respondents. Interestingly, Stih:vyn does not 
make any assertion on appeal, as it did below, that the Page Respondents were not privies to 
Anaconda/Portfolio such that they are not entitled to the benefits of claim preclusion in these 
proceedings. See Ticor Title Co. v. Stanton, 144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613, 618 (2007) 
(claim preclusion applies to the same parties or their privies from the prior litigation). Rather, 
Stilwyn's argument in this regard 1s solely focused upon IFB's relationship with 
Ananconda/Portfolio and makes no of the Page Respondents. (Appellant's Brief at 32-
33) Its argument in this regard is simply the extension of its previously advanced assertion that 
as these individuals and entities were not parties in the Federal Case they cannot be considered 
"opposing parties" such that Stilwyn was obligated to join these parties to the Federal Case in 
order to bring these claims against them. (Appellant's Brief at page 26-27) 
However, it should be noted it has been held that "an unnamed party may be so closely 
identified with a named party as to qualify as an "opposing party" under Rule 13(a)." 
Transamerica Occidental L[fe Ins. Co. v. Aviation Office of Am., Inc., 292 F.3d 384,390 (3d Cir. 
2002). In so concluding, the application of "opposing party" is interpreted broadly "for 
essentially the same reasons that courts have interpreted "transaction or occurrence" liberally-
RESPONDENTS OPENING BRIEF- PAGE 15 
19285-00 I I 697952 
to 
Occidental 
to policy economy underlying 13 ." Transamerica 
Ins. Co., 292 F.3d at 391. Accordingly, "[w]here parties are functionally 
... , where an unnamed party controlled the litigation, or where ... an unnamed party 
was the alter ego of the named party, they should be treated as opposing parties within the 
meaning of Rule 13." Id. 
In this regard, the allegations of Stilwyn's own complaint against Page Respondents, 
reveals that, as far as Stilwyn is concerned, these individuals are the functional equivalent of 
AnancondaiP01tfolio, controlled the litigation involving AnacondaiPortfolio, or the alter ego of 
Anaconda/Portfolio. (See, R. Vol. 1, pp. 70-96.) While the Page Respondents denied the 
assertions in Stilwyn' s Second Amended Complaint with respect to the alleged wrongful 
purposes and design of their relationships with these entities, they do not deny their direct and 
close relationship with AnacondaiPortfolio, whether as members, owners and/or managers. (R. 
Vol. 2, 440-444.) Thus, Stihvyn simply caimot have it both ways. It cannot assert that these 
individuals have such a close connection with Anaconda/Portfolio that they should be subject to 
personal liability for Stilwyn's claims, but deny that they were so closely aligned that they 
should be considered "opposing parties" despite their non-appearance as parties in the Federal 
Case. 
However, as noted above, Stihvyn's argument concerning the application of its "opposing 
party" defense does not address the facts upon which the dismissal of the claims against the Page 
Respondents was actually granted. (R. Vol. 5, p. 1097.) (stating "the parties here were either 
parties in the Federal Case or in privity with the parties in the Federal Case") Accordingly, the 
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record remains unrebutted on appeal, just as it was when presented to the trial court in the first 
instance, that these individuals derive a direct financiai interest from Anaconda!Pmtfolio's 
participation in the Federal Case. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 440-444.) As the record stands unrefuted, this 
Court should affirm the District Court's dismissal of Stilvvyn's claims against the Page 
Respondents on the basis of claim preclusion,.· regardless of any conclusion as to the 
interpretation of "opposing party" presently urged by Stih7-,Yn in this case. 
E. The Page Respondent's Request Attorneys Fees and Costs. 
As argued in the Page Respondents' Cross-Appellants' Brief, the Page Respondents 
requested an award of attorney fees and costs based on Idaho Code 12-121. The trial court 
denied the Page Respondents' request. For the reasons advanced in the Page Respondents' 
Cross-Appellants' Brief, the Page Respondents assert that this conclusion was in err and not only 
should it be awarded attorneys fees and costs from the underlying proceeding, but the attorney 
fees and costs they have incurred in defending this appeal as well. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Stilv,ryn voluntarily and with clear purpose intervened into the Federal Case between 
Anaconda/P01tfolio. It did so based on its representation that it possessed an interest in the real 
property secured by the subject loan that it alleged was being harmed by Anaconda/Portfolio's 
continued assertion of an interest in the same real property. Its intervention was granted \Vithout 
limitation or condition and its status in the case became as if it were an original party to the 
Federal Case. Upon its intervention, it was no mere bystander and, consistent with that status as 
a party to the litigation, Stilwyn by its own admission "actively pursued its rights against 
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Anaconda under the slander of title claim." Stilwyn's voluntary decision thereafter to abandon 
the Federal Case in favor of pursuing it again in the instant case was done at its own peril and 
should not be excused from the proper application of claim preclusion to all of its claims against 
the Respondents generally, but certainly to the Page Respondents specifically. 
Accordingly, the Page Respondents request that this Court affirm the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment on all of the Stilwyn"s claims against the Page Respondents. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this z.&'t;ay of August, 2014. 
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